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Introduction 
 
Social and political concepts, such as globalisation and terrorism have been 
referred to as essentially contested concepts.  This is because such concepts are always 
laden with value judgements and, as Popper has suggested, issues of values do not admit 
of scientific adjudication.  However, despite the contestability of these concepts, there is 
usually a way to begin inquiry into them.  One way is to select, among the diversity of 
meanings, the one/ones that are essential and relevant to the project which a particular 
investigator wants to undertake.  In other words, concepts can be defined stipulatively to 
reflect and capture the standpoint from which a given reality is being investigated. 
 
 What we want to do in this paper is not to engage in  the act of analysis alone but 
also to adopt a position by means of which substantive issues can be raised and addressed 
with respect to the concepts of globalisation and terrorism.  In this regard, there is little 
doubt that globalization and terrorism, taken as separate phenomena, currently top the list 
of social and political concepts that are engaging the attentions of both the theoreticians 
and practitioners of politics.  Without much analysis we can feel the effects of these 
phenomena.  However, what is not immediately visible is the connection between 
globalization and terrorism.  This requires analysis to enable us understand and deal with 
two of the major social and political  phenomena of our time which are threatening to 
obliterate all hope of having peace and tranquillity in our world.  
 
Globalisation 
 
 Different persons have said different things about the term “globalisation”. 
However, there is convergence of opinion that it is a process that is worldwide in scope. 
As a process, some have seen it as inevitable and irreversible (Beck 2001); while others  
have seen it as inexorable and unstoppable (Marquand 2000).  Yet others have seen the 
term in the form of a metaphor; a “shrinking world” (Plattner 2002).  The essence of this 
metaphor is that we live in a world in which development, whether positive or negative, 
in one area has consequences for people elsewhere.  The “shrinking” of the world has 
ironically given rise to both cooperation and conflict, as it can be witnessed in various 
world organizations and nationalist movements respectively.  Some writers have seen 
globalisation from an ideological perspective.  For instance, Ali Mazrui considers 
globalisation as a synonym for Westernisation or even Americanisation (1990).  For 
those who see globalisation from an ideological perspective, the term does not represent 
any positive or objective reality, rather, it is a kind of process which enables the strong to 
subjugate the weak. 
 
 Globalisation has its own epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. The 
epistemology of globalisation is exemplified in such notions like universalism and 
objectivity; while its metaphysics is instantiated in the notion of monism and its ethics in 
the notion of objectivism.  The central idea in all this is that the world is a global village 
in which all its aspects are inter-related, such that development in one region of the world 
affects the way of life other people living in another region.  Zaki Laidi gave a graphic 
account of what is intended here: “globalisation is a process of intensifying social 
relations on a worldwide scale that results in an increasing disjunction between space and 
time” (Laidi 2002 : 69). 
 
 Globalisation has come in different forms - economic, political and cultural.  The 
economic dimension of globalisation is called globalism (Beck 2001).  By globalism is 
meant the view that the world market eliminates or supplants political action, that is, the 
ideology of the world market, the ideology of neo-liberalism (Beck 2001:100).  For 
example, globalism implies that a complex space, such as Jamaica - its state, economy, 
culture, foreign policy - can be run in the same way that a company is run. 
 
 The political dimension of globalisation encapsulates the homogeneity of political 
values and principles, most important of which are democracy and democratic attitudes. 
As a matter of fact, some writers have identified globalisation with democratization 
(Platter 2002).  The universalistic nature of globalisation and democracy has been 
manifested in contemporary drive toward ideas, like freedom, human rights, equality and 
democratic procedures like election through the ballot box.  It is a known fact that today, 
Western politicians are prepared to denounce any state that is not practicing (liberal) 
democracy as an illegitimate regime. 
 
  In its cultural aspects, globalisation has given rise to what nowadays is called 
mass culture, in which transmission of cultural ideas from one region of the world to 
another takes place.  It is therefore believed that the intermingling of culture would give 
rise to a global culture.  This attitude towards cross-cultural transmission has led to the 
belief that national culture is in retreat. 
 
  Some authors on globalisation have believed that the phenomenon has furthered 
Western, especially American interests, and contributed to the strengthening of American 
power.   For instance, Ali Mazrui has seen globalisation as Americanisation of the human 
race and the humanization of America (Mazrui 1990).  However, despite the domineering 
and hegemonic features that have been attributed to globalization, it has not gone 
unchallenged.  On the political sphere, challenges to globalization have come in form of 
religious fundamentalism, “terrorist” acts, ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts. 
 
Terrorism 
 
The word “terrorism” is derivative of the word “terror”, which, according to the  
Oxford English Dictionary means “extreme fear”.  Its verb form, “terrorize” means to 
“threaten and frighten” (Soanes  2002).  The  personification of the word, that is, terrorist, 
will then mean a person that threatens or frightens.  We may observe here that the 
dictionary meaning of the word makes it to be vacuous in the sense that it applies to 
everything.  Thus, given the dictionary definition, a father that threatens his son with 
punishment  on account of bad behaviour, a husband or wife that threatens one another  
with divorce on account of infidelity, a lecturer that threatens  his students with failure on 
account of non-attendance of lectures, are all terrorists. 
 
 However, when the word is used in its distinctive political setting we start to 
appreciate a specific phenomenon that has been the object of various analysis, definitions, 
commentaries, hatred, commendations, condemnations, approval and disapproval. 
Terrorism is a highly emotive term, for it conveys many things to different people.  It is 
also a value laden term, because it shows where we stand in various positions within the 
political and social spectrum.  This has accounted for the popular saying that “one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. 
 
 However, given the disagreement among theoreticians and practitioners of politics 
about the meaning of the term terrorism, one thing seems to be clear; terrorism is a form 
of violence, and like violence, it causes injury to human lives and property.  But what is 
regarded as an injury is also subject to different interpretations. 
 
 As we have seen above, just like the word “violence”, the word “terrorism” 
admits of two kinds of definition; there is the narrow definition and there is the extended 
definition.  The narrow definition limits the definition of terrorism to the physical actions 
of human beings which inflict painful and physical injuries on their victims.  This is the 
kind of definition that is prevalent, both in the literature and in the current situations in 
our world, where whopping sums of money are spent or allocated by states to fight 
terrorism.  Let us see few instances of this kind of definition: 
 
(i) A war in which a secret army – one whose members have other overt 
occupations, wear no uniforms and do not otherwise admit their 
membership openly spread fear (Hughes 1983: 5), 
 
(ii) Use of illegal violence to gain political ends (Apter 1979), and 
 
(iii) The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatants by sub-national groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience. (USDoS “Patterns of 
Global Terrorism” 2003). 
 
 One of the merits of the narrow definition of terrorism is its concreteness.  The 
paradigm cases of such definition include: assassination, bombing, hijacking, and hostage 
taking.  These are physical actions by means of which human beings inflict pain and 
physical injury on one another.  This is why most people would agree that such actions 
come closest to what can be described as terrorism. 
 
 However, when “terrorism” is viewed from a broad perspective, one begins to see 
the inadequacies of the narrow definition of the term.  The first flaw in the narrow 
definition is that it limits terrorism to the effects which such actions have on its victims 
without considering the cause or the motive for such actions.  The consequence of such 
conception of terrorism is that the factor of agency, that is, who engages in terrorism and 
the reason for such action is omitted.  The inclusion of the factor of agency in a more 
adequate definition of terrorism has been responsible for the controversies that surround 
the definition of terrorism.  However, this factor is essential if we are to capture 
adequately the reality of terrorism as a specific phenomenon or process.  Thus terrorism 
may be the act of an individual or a group or government.  What is essential in this kind 
of definition is that it can be established that a government which adopts the policy of 
pre-emptive strike and which has the capacity to bomb or inflict injury on any segment of 
a civilian population of a potential enemy, is involved in terrorism. 
 
 We have to observe here that most of the problems confronting us in our world, 
especially within national and international politics border on hypocrisy, or the use of 
double standards.  Instead of calling spade a spade, we tend to de-emphasize the real evil 
motives for the negative actions which destroy other peoples’ lives and call hypocrisy 
diplomacy.  Thus, if we want to deal with terrorism and the issues that it evokes, there is 
the need to be realistic.  Thus, according to Harris, if we are worried about the morality of 
using terror as a method of political persuasion, and if we are prudentially fearful of 
being the victim of terrorism, then in either case, we have the strongest of motives for a 
broad conception of terrorism and a wide discussion of the issues it raises.  According to 
him, the problem of terrorism narrowly conceived is minute (Harris 1983: 2). 
 
That Harris observation is essentially correct is borne out by the fact that the 
states that are now crying foul about terrorism are themselves creation out of terrorist 
acts.  The United States emerged from a revolution which is a form of violence, the state 
of Israel was also a creation from acts of war.   The United States also overthrew Saddam 
Hussein by acts that can be referred to as terrorism.  In these situations there were ample 
evidence that a lot of civilians and non-combatants were killed and properties destroyed; 
the very effect that accounts for the condemnation of terrorism. 
 
The Morality of Terrorism 
  
The factor of agency in the definition of terrorism raises the issue of causation.  It 
also raises the issue of human responsibility.  Thus, consideration is usually given to the 
antecedent causes of acts of terrorism and in this, moral issues are always involved.  An 
individual is regarded as a moral agent who can be held responsible for his/her actions.   
This differentiates him/her from a brute or a lunatic who is never held responsible.  But 
those who view terrorism from a narrow perspective are apt to equate an individual who 
engages in the act of terrorism as somebody who is “psychologically warped” (Arblaster  
1977).  This means that such a person should be treated like a patient and should not be 
taken seriously.  To our mind, such a view is an attempt to dodge the moral issues that are 
raised by the question of terrorism.  In most cases, those who engage in acts of terrorism 
are clear headed, with a commitment to a cause. Thus, according to Altaf Gauhar, 
 
The Bengal terrorist committed act of outrage against British officials in India, 
but saw himself as a martyr to the cause of freedom…  The Black Africans who 
perpetrate acts of arson and killings are not out to destroy life and property: they 
see themselves engaged in an unequal and violent struggle against apartheid.  The 
Palestinians and the Shias are driven to acts of terrorism in pursuit of their 
political rights (Gauhar 1985: 8). 
 
 There have been accusations and counter accusations among people and their 
governments with respect to those who engage in terrorism against one another.  The 
basic problem that underlies any agitation against the state revolves around the legitimacy 
of the state, and this is a moral issue.  As observed by Macfarlane, “Violence against the 
state is essentially an expression of a denial of the legitimacy of the state either in itself or 
in its workings” (Macfarlane 1974: 41-42).  Charner Perry, alluding to this view, also 
points out that: 
 
Men’s unruly unstable emotion present difficult problems; but even if we assume 
a great increase in ‘rational’ control, pragmatic calculations are not likely to lead 
to the disappearance of violence until we have institutions which, by providing 
protection, make violence both unnecessary and ‘disadvantageous’( Perry 1970: 
3). 
 
Thus, the morality of terrorism revolves round the question of the legitimacy or 
otherwise of an individual or group or a state to use violence to achieve a political 
objective.  This being the case, there cannot be a straight forward justification or 
condemnation for any act of terrorism.  What is needed to be done is to look at what is 
happening in situations where acts of terrorism are being perpetrated.  Such observations 
are better made, first by focusing on the antecedent causes of such acts and the responses 
that are made to them.  These issues might be very complex to deal with, but one has to 
take the trouble to conduct investigation into them.  It is by this approach that issues that 
border on the justification or otherwise of terrorism can be adequately grasped.  As John 
Harris has suggested: 
 
One cannot argue that terror is an unjustifiable weapon in one context but not in 
another.  And of course the converse is also true.  Those who think that rebel 
terrorism is justifiable cannot argue that State terrorism is eo ipso unjustifiable.  
The crucial question in each case is of course, not whether the use of terror is 
justifiable, but whether it is justified (Harris  1983: 4). 
 
The moral of this position is that people condemning terrorism on moral grounds, for 
instance, that it inflicts pain on innocent people should also examine actions they accept 
such as wars, which most often than not need tactics which also involve the killing of 
innocents and non-combatants.  It is hypocritical to talk about terrorism as threat to 
civilization, just as Bush, Blair and Putin were saying except in the sense that all 
violence, including war and state violence, is incompatible with a truly social and 
humane condition of existence. 
 
The Typology of Terrorism 
 
On the basis of a broad definition of terrorism, one can come up with a typology of 
terrorism that is all encompassing, but not necessarily exhaustive: 
 
 
 
1. State Terrorism:  This can be seen to involve two areas;  
 
(i) This involves covert action, like the denial of freedom, through detention without trial.  
For instance, detention of suspected Al-qaeda and Taliban supporters in Guantanamo Bay 
in Cuba by the US government.  The use of terror to interrogate suspects in the form of 
harsh techniques aimed at breaking the will of the prisoner. 
 
(ii) Overt acts, like the use of state security operatives to assassinate perceived enemies.  
For instance, the killing of the spiritual leader of Hamas by Israeli Forces on 22nd of 
March, 2004. 
 
2 Left terrorism: 
 
(i) Terrorism directed against the state as a state, e.g. anarchism, Marxism. 
 
(ii) Terrorism directed against a particular state that carries out or supports acts of terror 
against a segment of a population on racial, religious, class, and other primordial 
grounds.  For example Hamas, Fanonism, Basque nationalism, Hezbollah, Al-qaeda 
organization, African National Congress, Mau-Mau of Kenya. 
 
(3) Bio- terrorism. Terror caused by human inventions, e.g. genetically modified foods, 
global transmission of infectious diseases, e.g. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS). 
 
(4) Environmental terrorism: Human induced climate change, e.g. emissions of some 
green house gases as a result of anthropogenic activities leading to global warming.  
Pollution of the ecosystem through urbanization, production of weapon of mass 
destruction, deposit of toxic wastes in foreign countries by multinational companies, 
release of oil into the sea  by Iraqi Forces during the First Gulf War. 
 
Globalization and Terrorism: The Connection 
 
Although there may be different routes to identifying a linkage between 
globalization and terrorism, in this section we want to focus on two routes, (i) the 
perceived effects of globalization, as having the tendency to weaken the nation state, and 
(ii) the political dimension of globalization, exemplified in liberal democracy as the only 
viable form of democracy. 
  
One of the effects of globalization is the tendency it has to de-emphasize attention 
on the nation state as the basic unit of political organization.  The earlier notion that links 
territory with political power has been broken and what we witness now is the different 
webs of governance spreading across national frontiers.  We now have transnational 
institutions linking one nation to the other.   
 
What this means in reality is a shift from the earlier concern in the beginning of 
the Twentieth Century, when attention was focused on the nation as the defining mark of 
political identity.  However, the issue of political identity has not been addressed by 
globalization and this has paved the way for different primordial groups to act as the 
fulcrum for the promotion and realization of political identity.  Religion is one of the 
phenomena that have replaced the nation as the principal source of collective identity.  
But religion, like any other human institution, seems to thrive on emotions and this 
explains the existence of many fundamentalist religious groups that cut across the two  
major religions of the world - Islam and Christianity.  Andrew Heywood (1992) has 
observed that the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism has emerged as a sub-variety 
of ethnic nationalism and this has been significantly noticed in parts of the world where 
national identity has been challenged or threatened.  Examples of religious 
fundamentalist groups are; Buddhism of the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, the Jewish settler 
movement in Israel, the Hindu and Sikh in India. 
  
The linkage of religious fundamentalism with terrorism is brought out in the 
second item we alluded to earlier.  This is the global idea that (liberal) democracy is the 
only viable form of government in the contemporary world.  One of the central ideas of 
liberal democracy is the explicit separation of state from civil society.  This view, which 
dates back to J. S Mill’s Harm Principle, establishes a separation between the realm of 
individual action, which is private, and the realm of collective action, which is public. 
Institutions like religion and morality fall within the realm of private actions and they are 
not to be subject to state intervention.  The public realm, on the other hand, belongs to the 
sphere of the collective and it is subject to rules made and enforced by political authority. 
 
In the Twenty first Century, John Rawls (1993) is an advocate of the separation of 
state from civil society.  In his Political Liberalism, Rawls tried to expose the modern 
version of political liberalism by urging that political affairs should be separated, or at 
least be seriously distanced from the various moral and religious loyalties and 
programmes of individuals and groups of citizens.  Gordon Graham (2000) has expressed 
the content of this position in two different but connected propositions.  The first is that 
the right must take precedence over the good.  In other words, in the political sphere, the 
implementation and application of impartial rules of social justice and civil liberty must 
take precedence over competing conceptions of what is or not a valuable way of spending 
a human life (the good).  The second way of putting the liberal doctrine is that the state 
must be neutral with respect to the moral alternatives with which a modern pluralist 
society presents its members.  One notable example cited by Graham concerns the issue 
that whether homosexuality is morally wrong or not is not the business of the legislator, 
and thus the goodness or badness of a gay lifestyle is a matter on which law should be 
neutral. 
  
We have to recall here that Rawls has insisted in Political Liberalism that the type 
of liberalism he is exposing is devoid of metaphysical considerations.  However, some of 
his critics have insisted that Rawlsian liberalism rests upon a mistake about human 
motivation  (Gordon 2000).  The argument is that it is not clear, given the Rawlsian –type 
argument for preferring the right over the good or the neutrality of the state, the 
individual who ranks the good over the right will abandon his/her cherished beliefs (the 
good) and  embrace the virtue of the state (the right).  The argument here is that 
individual cherished beliefs are usually deep rooted and fundamental and that it is often 
difficult to abandon such beliefs in favour of the requirements of the political order. 
  
Some of the critics of Rawls' liberalism have, contrary to him, given liberalism a 
strong metaphysical interpretation.  For instance, Michael Sandel (1982) has linked the 
idea behind personal cherished beliefs with the notion of personal identity.  According to 
this line of thought, to require someone to relegate his or her most cherished beliefs is to 
undermine who they are in a very strong sense:  
 
Thus to ask, say, the devout Roman Catholics to distance themselves from their 
religion in the way that Rawlsian liberalism does, in its attitude to laws on 
abortion for example, is to ask them to relinquish a part of who they are, to 
sacrifice something of their very  identity. In effect, it asks them to condone what 
in the depths of their hearts they believe to be murder for the sake of political 
authority. (Gordon 2000: 75). 
 
 It is from the above sketched out argument that the linkage between globalization 
and religious fundamentalism can be located.  To claim that an idea is fundamental is not 
in itself to link it with any religion.  Moral, political and cultural beliefs can be 
fundamental if the beliefs concerned are held with a high level of commitment, such that 
the holder of such beliefs would be reluctant to abandon them even in the face of other 
overriding principles.  Religious fundamentalism then is a variant of fundamentalism in 
the sense explained. 
  
It has been observed (Heywood 1998) that much of the spirit of religious 
fundamentalism is captured in its rejection of the public/private divide.  On one level, 
fundamentalism is a manifestation of the politics of identity.  The point being made by 
religious fundamentalism is that the secular nature of the public realm has weakened the 
traditional social norms to the extent that societies have lost their identities.  What is 
meant here can be explained by the fact of the degeneration of the moral and social norms 
that had made societies in the past to be cohesive and peaceful.  The idea here is that 
society is founded on some normative features which provide opportunities for 
individuals and groups to further their live goals and co-exist peacefully with one 
another.  Thus, in deference to his doctrine of the separation of state from civil society, 
Rawls has suggested a moral and normative basis for the existence of social institutions.  
According to him, “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions … laws and institutions, 
no matter how efficient and well-arranged, must be reformed or abolished if they are 
unjust” (Rawls 1999: 3).  This seems to be the heart of the matter and it is this which 
constitutes the major concern for the religious fundamentalist.  His belief is that the 
contemporary society has drifted away from the positive norms on which it was earlier on 
grounded, society has become so permissive to the extent that anything goes and this 
situation should not be allowed to continue.  But because globalisation has been 
responsible for the weakness of the nation state which could have provided safe haven for 
the protection of the cherished norms of the society, it is then believed that religion is an 
important avenue for filling the gap which globalization has created.  This is one of the 
explanations for introducing Islamic laws like the Sharia in some Islamic states and non 
Islamic states with a predominantly Moslem population, for example in some parts of the 
northern states of Nigeria. 
  
There are two ways in which religious fundamentalism has responded to the 
perceived corruption of the contemporary society.  The first, sometimes called ‘passive’ 
fundamentalism, takes the route of withdrawal and attempts to construct communities of 
believers untainted by the larger society.  Heywood gave as examples of this form of 
fundamentalism as the Amish in the United States and the Haredim of Israel.  The second 
response is ‘active’ fundamentalism, which takes the route of opposition and combat. 
This is the point at which fundamentalism spills over into terrorism.  In the contemporary 
world the motivation for terrorism has been manifested in the combination of religion, 
nationalism and fanaticism (Bamikole 1991).  The combination of these elements have 
accounted for why the major ’terrorists’ groups have been found in areas where there are 
individuals and groups who believe that the regeneration of the world can only be 
brought about by a holy war (jihad) and those that are fighting one injustice or the other 
and those that are strongly committed to an (utopian) human ideal. 
 
Old and New Terrorism  
 
David Carlton (2003) made a distinction between ‘old terrorism’ and ‘new 
terrorism’.  The distinction borders on the period in history when particular kind of 
terrorism was/is prevalent.  Old Terrorism dates back to the 1960s and 1970s.  The 
emphasis had frequently been on territorial grievances involving demands for 
independence from colonialism.  FNLA in Algeria, Mau-Mau of Kenya, ANC of South 
Africa, Basque Separatist of Spain are some of the well known perpetrators of the old 
form of terrorism.  According to Carlton, what these old terrorists have in common is that 
they have specific goals and their goals are always well defined and articulated.  They did 
not usually intend to maximize bloodshed, and their targets most often are identifiable 
individuals or properties. 
  
On the other hand, new terrorists are more internationally connected; they act in a 
network spread across territorial boundaries. One notable example of this type of 
terrorism is the Al-qaeda, headed by Osama Bin Laden.  Carlton identified these features 
with new terrorism: they are nihilistic; they are inspired by fanatical religious beliefs; 
they are willing to seek martyrdom through suicide; they rarely set aims that appear 
remotely attainable; they give no warnings; they do not engage in bargaining; they are 
willing and even eager to carry out the mass slaughter of non-combatants. 
  
We may note the following about Carlton’s distinction: (i) the distinction is only 
limited to Left terrorism and it does not include state terrorism.  Just as colonialism 
constituted a form of state terrorism which the Old Terrorism was responding to, 
globalization also constitutes a form of state terrorism which New Terrorism is currently 
responding to.  The evidence for this position is not far fetched.  For example, Fanon in 
The Wretched of the Earth (2001) made us to understand how colonialism accounted for 
the spread of terror and violence among the colonized and his suggestion that 
decolonization is always a violent phenomenon.   By the same token, we have seen in our 
contemporary world how Western powers, spearheaded by the United States, are 
unleashing acts of terror on some states in the world which are perceived as enemies of 
civilization.  The New Terrorism can be seen as a response to this international state 
terrorism.  (ii) Another observation that can be made with regards to Carlton distinction is 
that the parameters that are used to identify and differentiate Old Terrorism from New 
Terrorism are not mutually exclusive.  For instance, the Hamas may be regarded as a 
primordial terrorist organization but it can also be labelled as a New Terrorism in spite of 
the fact that it is not nihilistic, and is not only inspired by fanatical religious beliefs.  
 
There is even a sense in denying that New Terrorism is nihilistic.  Nihilism 
suggests a situation of nothingness, a situation where acts of terrorism are only 
perpetrated for its own sake.  One doubts whether there is any “terrorist organization” 
that engages in acts of terrorism without any form of justification, although it is another 
matter whether such justification can be rationally and morally defensible.  That the New 
Terrorism is not nihilistic is suggested by the 2004 attack on a passenger train in Spain.  
There was evidence that the attack was thoughtfully and tactfully coordinated.  The 
objective was to discredit the regime of Jose Maria Aznar who flirted with the United 
States in its invasion of Iraq.  By carrying out the attack three days to the general election 
the Al-Qaeda made a political point, and that point is that it is not just a nihilistic 
organization without any rationally defensible (political) goal; but that the Socialist party 
won the election is a pointer to the fact that globalization in form of internationalism is 
being challenged across local and national frontiers. 
 
Globalization, Terrorism and Philosophy 
 
At this point in the paper, we may observe two points.  The first is that 
globalization is an indisputable fact of our world which seems to be unstoppable.  The 
second point is that terrorism is a form of violence and violence has been inextricably 
linked with the state. 
  
In order to break the jinx of the recurrent outbreak of violence, there is the need to 
re-examine the notions of globalisation and the state in such a way that there is a 
redefinition of power and human relations.  We have to appreciate the fact that 
globalisation in its various dimensions has contributed to the development of some 
specific areas in national and international states, but there is also the fact that it has led 
to inequalities among states and injustices against some groups and individuals.  There is 
the need to address these problems if we are to reap the benefit of globalisation in full; 
chief among which is the guarantee of world security in a broad sense and in a worldwide 
sense.  By the same token, there is the need to move from the old conception of the state 
that identifies it with (legitimate) violence. 
  
We will recall that one of the identified features of globalisation is its attempt to 
(covertly, surreptitiously, invisibly, forcefully) unify the world.  While there are some 
instances where this can be done, there are also instances where it cannot be done, given 
the fact that we are living in a multicultural world, that is, a world made up of many and 
different groups, based on primordial affinities like religion, race culture, sex  etc.  This 
kind of world requires a kind of justice which cannot be grasped by the current power and 
human relations in the world. 
  
We will also recall that John Rawls (1999) opined that ‘justice is the first virtue of 
social institutions’.  However, the question here is what kind of justice?  This is where we 
think the philosopher will prove indispensable.  As R. M. Hare, has suggested, the only 
role which the philosopher can play towards the solution of problems in human affairs is 
to insist on rigor in reasoning (Hare 1979).   
 
We shall, in the rest of this paper, attempt to present a view of justice which we 
think can address the present face-off between the “terrorists” and anti-terrorists, which 
has resulted from some of the aspects of globalization. 
 
 
The idea of Justice in a Multicultural World 
 
One fact that can hardly be denied, either by political actors of the right or that of 
the left, is that the question of justice is the fundamental issue behind most of the political 
turmoil in our world.  If probed properly, the issue of justice can always be identified as 
the basic issue behind the actions of the so-called terrorist organizations.  It is, therefore, 
mandatory, if we want peace, security and stability in the world, to address properly the 
question of justice within a globalised and multicultural world. 
  
The way to address this problem will take both retrospective and prospective 
approaches.  Thus one kind of justice is the attempt to right a wrong that has been 
committed against an individual, a group, a race a nation, a sex, a culture in the past.  
This is a kind of justice that uses the backward looking approach of moral justification.  
Such approach denies the position that justification is only of the consequentialist form. 
A backward looking approach of the idea of justice considers the past relationship 
between one person or group of persons and another.  This kind of justice is exemplified 
in such concepts, like reparation, and reverse discrimination.  Thus, a group, like the 
Palestinian people who has been denied of their Homeland for decades requires, justice in 
the form of compensation for the injuries they had suffered  as well as returning unto 
them the land which is legitimately their own.  On the part of the Palestinian people also, 
they have to recognize the right of other people to exist, given the current situation of 
things and the need to maintain peaceful coexistence with their neighbours.  
  
On the inequalities that exist among nations as a result of globalisation, there 
should be a kind of cross-national dialogue among and between nations on the basis of 
sovereign equality.  One factor that has been responsible for inequality among nations is 
the arrogant pretensions to power among some nations that have considered themselves 
as more “developed” and more “civilized”, more “powerful” than the rest of humanity.  It 
might be a sociological and political fact that “might is right”, this is morally inadequate 
in the sense that “might” is not a distinctive feature of a de jure state and if we do not 
have to plunge further into the abyss of the Hobessian state of nature , then we need to 
redefine our conception of power relations; for no matter how small or weak a state is, 
insofar as it is a sovereign state, then it should enjoy the same autonomous status as the 
most populous and powerful state in the world.  In order to restore the moral equality of 
states, the dialogue should be a committed one, that is, a kind of dialogue which 
recognizes the cherished beliefs of each group and having the political will to negotiate, 
and bargain, leading to toleration and acceptance of one another’s’ fundamental beliefs to 
the benefit of the groups and the benefit of humanity as a whole. 
  
To use the Rawlsian language, there has to be a reconciliation between the good 
and the right.  The good, which is the cherished beliefs of individuals and groups, should 
not be held dogmatically.  In the spirit of multiculturalism, people should imbibe the idea 
of looking at issues from more than one perspective.  Thus, there cannot be a proof that 
there is only one way that an injustice can be addressed or that a better state of affairs put 
into place other than violence or terrorism.  This is epistemologically naïve.  It is also 
epistemologically incorrect to claim that a particular means will usher in a particular goal 
intended by such means.  According to Karl Popper (1991), this belief is called utopia 
and he believes that utopia leads to violence because the actor will try to make use of all 
means to attain his goal, including, of course, violence.  This view is also applicable to 
the apostles of democracy in our time.  These people also believe that all means possible 
can be used to make some people embrace democracy even when the culture of such 
people is not in tune with the kind of democracy that is being sold to them. 
  
Before we bring this section to a close, we should recognize one rational and 
reasonable approach at addressing the terrorist question.  After he won the general 
election in Spain, Zapatero, the Prime Minister elect, denounced the way by which 
terrorism has been fought by means of bombs.  He said that terrorism can only be 
defeated by the rule of law and intelligence.  Whatever he meant by these terms, a rule of 
law and intelligence are civil ways of approaching a (moral) problem and these are in 
conformity with a civilized way of life.  On the other hand, there were some groups of 
Palestinians who had sued for a peaceful means of fighting the Palestinian cause in the 
wake of Israel’s assassination Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas Organization 
on 22nd of March, 2004.  The world requires the likes of these two sets of people in order 
to break the cycle of terror which has left both the terrorist and the anti-terrorist in a no 
win situation but which  has contributed to the insecurity of our world. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Globalisation and terrorism are specific phenomena that are steering the world in 
the face; whether for good or for evil.  It might be the case that some people are unwilling 
to place globalisation and terrorism side by side as issues that are connected - 
globalisation may be seen as civilization and terrorism as barbarism, yet a critical 
discourse of these issues will show that the situation is not as simple as it seems at first. 
 
In this paper, we have attempted to link terrorism with globalisation, especially in 
its political and cultural dimensions.  What we have discovered and what has been borne 
out by experience is that the countries that have declared war against terrorism are using 
terror to combat terror.  This balance of terror situation can only lead to a dead end 
without any of the sides winning the battle. 
 
What is being suggested in this paper, therefore, is that there should be a break 
from a monistic social and political philosophy  the monism of globalisation and the 
monism of terrorism.  The world is so complex, such that not only one ideology can 
dominate it and not only one means can be used to realize human ideal in it. 
 
The first step towards this is to see the human person as the focus of all attempts 
to effect changes in the world.  If globalisation is to achieve its goals, then the interests of 
human beings, whatever their race, creed gender should be taken into consideration.   On 
the other hand, if terrorism is to achieve its means as instrument of political change, then 
human interests should also be at the back of the mind of the terrorist.  
 
In the wake of the Madrid bombing a few weeks ago, one commentator said 
“terrorists have lost their humanity, in the sense that they do not reason”.  What this 
statement suggests is that there is a place for reason in this whole business of act of 
terrorism and the act of fighting terrorism.  If this is the case, then reason should play a 
role in the resolution of the imbroglio.  The terrorists and the anti-terrorists would have to 
go back to the drawing board and allow reason to prevail over emotion and arrogance. 
 
One way of effecting this, is for actors and participants in world affairs to come 
together and reason out alternative ways of addressing the problem of the human 
condition.  If we have to face it, human beings all over are faced with similar problems - 
both natural and human - problems of disease, natural disasters, poverty, hunger, 
violence, injustice, inequality.  It might be the case that these problems are localized or 
nationalized, but there can still be basis for coming together to address them.  One cannot 
but agree with Fanon’s view, expressed in the concluding paragraph of The Wretched of 
the Earth: “For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a 
new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.” (Fanon  2001: 
255). 
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